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I. INTRODUCTION
Cory Tschogl is a rehabilitation therapist who lives in the San Francisco Bay Area.1 Because Tschogl was “priced out” of buying a home
in the Valley, she decided to invest in a vacation rental condominium
(“condo”) in Palm Springs, California.2 In order to make ends meet
with the higher rents in San Francisco, Tschogl had been renting her
condo to travelers through the hugely popular company, Airbnb,3
which provides an online platform for travelers seeking short-term accommodations to connect with individuals who have space to rent in
their homes.4 According to Tschogl, this arrangement had worked
well for a year until she was contacted through Airbnb by a potential
guest who told Tschogl he needed “accommodations for an extended
business trip” and asked to rent her condo for a little more than a
month.5 Tschogl’s initial interactions with this guest “seemed OK,” so
she agreed to rent her condo to him from May 25 to July 8, a total of
forty-four days.6 In retrospect, however, Tschogl admits the fact that
the guest did not have any reviews on Airbnb should have been a
warning sign, and soon enough, what should have been a simple shortterm rental arrangement turned into a nightmare for Tschogl.7
It started out innocently enough. On the first day after Tschogl’s
guest checked in he called to complain about two odd things.8 First,
the guest complained that he did not like the tap water because it
“was cloudy,” and second, he did not like the gated entry to the complex.9 Tschogl’s guest asked for a full refund to which Tschogl readily
agreed because Tschogl had a “bad gut feeling” about him.10 Tschogl
contacted Airbnb immediately, and after multiple emails and phone
calls, the company responded two days later stating it had asked the
guest to leave and that Tschogl was entitled to keep an appropriate
portion of the guest’s fee in consideration of the two days he stayed in
the condo.11 So what is the problem? Tschogl’s guest decided to stay
in the condo for the duration of the rental term despite the fact that the
guest asked for a refund and was subsequently asked to vacate the
1. Julie Bort, Airbnb Host: A Guest is Squatting In My Condo and I Can’t Get
Him to Leave, SF GATE (July 21, 2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/technology/businessinsider/article/Airbnb-Host-A-Guest-Is-Squatting-In-My-Condo-And5638090.php.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Oct. 5,
2014).
5. Bort, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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condo by both Tschogl and Airbnb.12 At a loss for what to do, and
after trading several antagonistic texts with the guest, Tschogl decided
to let the guest remain in the condo for the remainder of his reservation.13 Then on June 25, Airbnb again contacted the guest after it was
unable to collect payment for the last part of the reservation and
warned the guest either to pay or to leave—he did neither.14 Finally,
on the last day of the reservation Tschogl sent the guest a text warning
him that the utilities would be shut off if he did not vacate the premises.15 Tschogl’s guest responded in kind, threatening to press charges
for “blackmail and damages caused by [Tschogl’s] negligence and malicious misconduct . . . as well as medical bills for [his] brother’s hospital visit” after he “got sick” from drinking the murky tap water.16
Tschogl’s guest further asserted he was legally occupying the condo
and that he had rights.17 Moreover, the guests claimed that loss of
electricity would threaten the work he does which brings in between
$1,000 to $7,000 a day.18 As it turns out, Tschogl’s guest was not totally wrong.19 After hiring a lawyer Tschogl discovered that, in California, a person who rents property for at least thirty days is
considered a tenant on a month-to-month lease.20 Thus, Tschogl’s
guest was afforded some protection under California law, and therefore, could not be forced to vacate the property without Tschogl first
taking appropriate legal measures. In this case, getting Tschogl’s guest
to leave required a full-blown eviction proceeding, which typically
take between three to six months and can cost anywhere from $3,000
to $5,000 in legal fees.21 After Tschogl contacted two news outlets to
share her story, Airbnb responded saying it had apologized for not
meeting its own standards and that Tschogl would be fully refunded
the cost of the reservation.22 Airbnb also promised to provide additional support moving forward, although it was ultimately up to
Tschogl to follow through with legal proceedings and evict the Airbnb
guest-turned-squatter.23
It is unlikely Tschogl ever thought she would find herself in a situation such as she did when looking for a way to supplement her income. While Tschogl does not blame Airbnb entirely for what
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Carolyn Said, Squatters Don’t Sit Well With Airbnb Hosts, SF GATE (July 25,
2014), http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Squatters-don-t-sit-well-with-Airbnbhosts-5631952.php.
17. Bort, supra note 1.
18. Said, supra note 16.
19. Bort, supra note 1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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happened, she believes Airbnb could do more to educate individuals
who rent space in their homes through Airbnb’s website, respond
more quickly when problems arise, and perhaps even insure them.24
As it stands now, Airbnb simply warns users that it is their responsibility to know the laws of their city in order to avoid situations such as
the Tschogl encountered.25
Airbnb is one example of the “Sharing Economy” whereby owners
and consumers connect to share “space, skill, and stuff” for monetary
and non-monetary benefits.26 Although this concept is not a new
one,27 it has garnered much attention recently due to the proliferation
of internet start-ups, which, like Airbnb, connect owners and consumers both easily and efficiently.28 The increasing relevance of the Sharing Economy, and likely continued success of Airbnb, provides an
opportunity to consider how Airbnb fits into traditional legal
frameworks and evaluate whether states and municipalities should enact laws regulating Airbnb.
Part II of this Article introduces the concept of the Sharing Economy, outlines different systems within it, and suggests reasons for its
success as well as future implications. Part II further considers the inception of Airbnb and potential for its continued success before
briefly discussing how Airbnb fits into the Sharing Economy, overall.
Part III focuses on the legal relationship that is created when, using
the platform Airbnb provides, individuals rent space in their homes to
travelers seeking short-term accommodations. Specifically, this relationship will be considered in the context of two distinct and longstanding areas of law: landlord and tenant law and the law of innkeepers. Part III traces the historical roots and evolution of both these areas of law with particular attention paid to the different rights and
obligations of the parties within each body of law. This Section provides the general framework for Part IV in which the Author argues
that the relationship between Airbnb “hosts” and “guests” is not so
easily defined under current law. That is, in individual cases a landlord-tenant relationship may be created, whereas in other circumstances the relationship may bear a closer resemblance to that of an
innkeeper and his guest. Part IV then considers policy arguments in
support of regulating Airbnb before concluding the Airbnb host and
24. Id.
25. Id.; What Legal and Regulatory Issues Should I Consider Before Hosting on
Airbnb?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/376 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
26. See Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating
the Sharing Economy, 58 B.B.J 6 (2014).
27. See id.; Tina Rosenberg, It’s Not Just Nice to Share, It’s the Future, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/its-not-justnice-to-share-its-the-future/.
28. See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy,
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/
airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/.
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guest relationship is best understood in terms of the law of innkeepers
and should be regulated accordingly.
II. AIRBNB

AND THE

SHARING ECONOMY

Airbnb is a self-described “community marketplace for people to
list, discover, and book unique accommodations around the world—
online or from a mobile phone.”29 Based in San Francisco and
founded in 2008, the company operates through its website to match
vacationers seeking affordable short-term accommodations with people who have room to rent in their homes—all for a reasonable price,
of course.30 Airbnb exemplifies what many commentators have
termed the Sharing Economy.31 That is, the Sharing Economy is
meant to refer to a new kind of capitalism made possible by advances
in technology whereby individuals can connect with consumers
through online platforms to “share” their assets for profit.32 At first
glance, this arrangement seems like a win-win situation for all the parties involved. After all, with regard to Airbnb, individuals are more
likely to travel if they can find inexpensive, alternative solutions to
commercial lodging, which, in turn, injects money into local economies.33 Renters are likewise at an advantage because Airbnb allows
them to easily convert unused space in their homes into extra income.34 Despite these advantages, however, Airbnb’s success has not
come without controversy.35 At the heart of this problem is the fact
that Airbnb and similar companies participating in the Sharing Economy simply do not fit into traditional legal frameworks, which leaves
many local governments struggling with the question of whether to
enact laws regulating Airbnb and, if so, to what extent.36
A. The Sharing Economy37
To better understand the Sharing Economy, it is important to first
understand some of the economic conditions that existed in America
29. About Us, supra note 4. Indeed, Airbnb’s app has more than one million
downloads and accounts for approximately 25% of the company’s users. Jordan
Crook, Airbnb’s Big 2012, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 7, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/
02/07/airbnbs-big-2012-4x-guest-growth-and-2x-the-number-of-listings-in-over-150countries-worldwide/.
30. About Us, supra note 4.
31. See Geron, supra note 28.
32. See Rosenburg, supra note 27.
33. See The Economic Impacts of Home Sharing, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb
.com/economic-impact/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (noting “travelers stay longer and
spend more” throughout the city).
34. See About Us, supra note 4.
35. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 26, at 7, 8.
36. Charles Gottlieb, Residential Short-Term Rentals: Should Local Governments
Regulate the “Industry”?, 65 PLANNING & ENVTL. L No. 2, p.4.
37. The term sharing economy has also been referred to variously as
“collaborative consumption,” the “asset-light lifestyle,” the “collaborative economy,”
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prior to the sharing revolution, which, in turn, contributed to this phenomenon. Next, the particular functions and qualities attributable to
the success of the Sharing Economy are considered. Finally, the future
implications of the Sharing Economy are briefly discussed.
1. Precursor and Evolution of the Sharing Economy
Beginning in the 19th century a class of young and well-to-do individuals emerged eager to showcase their wealth and social power.38
This class (later termed the “nouveau riche”) lavished money on expensive items such as clothes, jewelry, and cars in order to show that,
not only were they prosperous, but that they were different from “the
masses.”39 Thus, the consumer emphasis at this time was not on the
necessity or utility of goods, but rather on the buying power of the
individual, which, in turn, was directly linked with wealth and social
status.40 This trend became prominent in America during the 1920s,
while the mid-1950s witnessed the dawn of “hyper-consumerism,” a
term that was used to describe the American consumer’s endless quest
to acquire “more stuff in ever greater amounts.”41 What accounted for
the sudden and rapid growth of American consumerism? Commentators have identified at least four major sources that played a critical
role in feeding this phenomenon: the power of persuasion;42 the buy
now, pay later culture;43 the law of life cycles;44 and the “just one
more” factor.45 Over the past fifty years, however, it appears that
“peer economy,” or the “access economy.” The Sharing Economy: All Eyes on the
Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
technology-quarterly/21572914-collaborative-consumption-technology-makes-iteasier-people-rent-items.
38. RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 20 (HarperCollins Publishers 2010).
39. Id. It was at this time that Norwegian economist and sociologist Thorstein
Veblen coined the term “conspicuous consumption” to describe the lifestyle and
spending habits of the nouveau riche. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. BOTSMAN & ROO, supra note 38, at 21–23. The “power of persuasion” simply
means appealing to an individual’s desire to be attractive, fit, rich, powerful, etc. in
order to sell a particular good, or what we commonly refer to as advertising. Id.
43. Id. at 26. This refers to the influence of credit cards on our spending decisions.
Id. Studies have shown that credit cards alter our perception of the value of a product
and that using a credit card detaches the act of purchase from payment. Id. at 28–29.
These and other reasons lead to a simple credit equation: “The more credit we have,
the more stuff we can afford to buy, the more resources consumed, and the more
waste created.” Id. at 30.
44. All electronic consumer products, from cell phones to home appliances and
even cars, have a life cycle. Id. at 33, 36. The fact that these products will eventually
“expire” contributes to hyper–consumerism because Americans continue to purchase
these products over the course of their lifetime. See id. at 37. This situation is made
worse by the fact Americans often discard products still in the prime of their life in
order to acquire the next “new thing,” and moreover, many companies shorten the
lifetime of their products to increase sales. Id.
45. BOTSMAN & ROO, supra note 38, at 21.
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American hyper-consumerism has slowed down and is slowly being
replaced with a new consumer model—Collaborative Consumption,
also termed the Sharing Economy.46 This has occurred for two reasons: the first, a shift in values;47 and the second, a reemerging focus
on the collective good rather than the good of the individual.48 The
value shift recognizes that unrestrained individual consumerism is detrimental to our communities, the environment, and our personal relationships.49 This realization has led consumers to find ways to
maximize the utility of goods both that they buy, and that they do not
buy, while simultaneously re-strengthening community ties. In other
words, the former doctrine of consumer excess is being replaced with
a social and economic system that balances the needs of individuals
with the needs of communities and the planet.50
2. Sharing Economy Model
Participants in the Sharing Economy play two roles.51 First, a person may act as a “peer provider” by providing assets to rent, share, or
borrow.52 In contrast, a “peer user” consumes the available products
and services.53 Examples of the Sharing Economy abound and vary in
scale, purpose, and stage of development.54 Generally, these can be
organized into three categories: product service systems, redistribution markets, and collaborative lifestyles.55 Product service systems
enable people to enjoy the benefit of a product without having to
purchase the product outright,56 whereas redistribution markets enable used or pre-owned goods to be redistributed from areas where
they are not needed to areas where they are based on free exchange,
sale, barter, or a combination.57 Underlying each of these systems
within the Sharing Economy are four principles that have been key to
its success: critical mass, idling capacity, belief in the commons, and
trust between strangers.58 The fourth and perhaps most important
46. Id. at 44, 63.
47. Id. at 44. This value shift is premised on a “growing consumer consciousness
that finite growth and consumption based on infinite resources are not a viable combination.” Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. BOTSMAN & ROO, supra note 38, at 63.
51. Id. at 70.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 71. These include tool exchanges, land share, clothing swaps, ride sharing, CouchSurfing, and time banks, to name a few. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 72.
58. Id. at 75. The first principal, critical mass, describes the existence of enough
momentum within a particular system that it becomes self-sustaining. Id. Critical mass
is crucial to the success of Sharing Economy systems for two reasons. First, it provides
consumers with a wide array of products and services to choose from, and when con-
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principle in collaborative lifestyle systems, such as Airbnb, is trust between strangers.59 In contrast to the hyper-consumerism model, where
an intermediary facilitates the transaction between production and
consumption, the Sharing Economy eliminates the need for an intermediary, and instead, replaces it with platforms that enable peer-topeer transactions. Although companies that provide these platforms
are, in a sense, acting as intermediaries, they are not there to police
these transactions, but rather to act as “curators and ambassadors” in
facilitating these peer-to-peer exchanges and contributions to the
marketplace.60
3. Future Implications
Although the Sharing Economy is being touted as a revolutionary
new idea, in fact, in some fields it has been around for millennia.61
However, an integral part of the Sharing Economy—the means by
which consumers connect with one another to share resources—is being revolutionized due to advances in technology and, in particular,
the recent proliferation of internet start-ups, which create digital platforms that connect consumers both easily and efficiently.62 This is significant for several reasons. For one, the Sharing Economy shows
consumers that happiness is not defined solely in terms of material
goods; instead, happiness takes on a broader meaning as less emphasis
is placed on individual ownership of goods and more on community
exchanges.63 Second, an individual consumer’s reputation will have
heightened importance, as this will often determine access to the Sharing Economy as well as the extent of a consumer’s power and influence therein.64 Finally, the Sharing Economy will likely continue to
promote entrepreneurism and the establishment of new businesses.65
sumers are satisfied with the available choices, they are more likely to be pleased with
the overall experience of acquiring these products or services. Id. at 75–76. Second,
critical mass engenders a core group of frequent and loyal users, which help to not
only sustain the system, but also grow it by attracting consumers that might have not
otherwise chosen to participate. Id. at 82. In other words, otherwise reluctant consumers can feel comfortable participating in the Sharing Economy because they can see
that “everyone else is doing it.” Id. The second principle, idling capacity, refers to the
unused potential of items when they are not in use and considers how this potential
can be redistribution to maximize an item’s productivity and usage. Id. at 83–84. The
third principle, the belief in “the commons” has been widely understood to mean that
individuals, acting in their own short term self interests, will misuse and overuse
shared resources and that because of this “tragedy is inevitable.” Id. at 88–89. History,
however, has demonstrated this is not always the case, and in the context of the Sharing Economy, the more participants there are the better the system works, meanwhile
value is created for the individual. Id. at 90–91.
59. Id. at 91.
60. Id. at 92.
61. Rosenburg, supra note 27.
62. Geron, supra note 28.
63. BOTSMAN & ROO, supra note 38, at 217.
64. See id. at 217–20.
65. See id. at 220–23.
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In summary, the Sharing Economy meets the same consumer needs
as under the hyper-consumerism model while at the same time addressing waste and environmental issues, reducing the number of new
products and raw materials consumed, and changing the consumer
mind-set from one of individual self-interest to that of the collective
good.66 Whatever impact the Sharing Economy will have on the future, one thing is certain—with at least 100 companies sprouting up
over the past four years eager to participate in this new market,67 and
with estimated revenues in excess of $3.5 billion—the new, revolutionized Sharing Economy is a phenomenon that is here to stay.
B. Airbnb
The following Section details Airbnb’s inception and potential for
continued success before briefly discussing the role Airbnb plays in
the Sharing Economy overall.
1. Humble Beginnings
It all started with two friends, three air mattresses, and the need for
some fast cash in order to pay the rent. In October of 2007, future
Airbnb co-founder Brian Chesky was a recent graduate of the Rhode
Island School of Design.68 After working a while for a Los Angeles
design firm, Chesky became “fed up” and left his job for San Francisco to stay at the home of his good friend and future Airbnb cofounder Joe Gebbia, who agreed to split the cost of rent with
Chesky.69 At the time, Chesky’s share of the rent came to $1,150, but
the now unemployed Chesky only had $1,000 in the bank.70 Fortunately, the two friends had an idea to make some quick money.71 It
just so happened that the week Chesky arrived in town, San Francisco
was hosting the Industrial Designers Society of America and there
were no more available hotel rooms in the area for conference attendees.72 Chesky and Gebbia had the idea of turning their house in
to a bed and breakfast for the attendees; however, instead of beds the
two friends only had air mattresses to offer their guests.73 So Chesky
and Gebbia inflated the mattresses, advertised themselves online as
“Airbed and Breakfast,” and successfully hosted three people at a rate
66. Id. at 213.
67. Geron, supra note 28.
68. Thomas Friedman, Welcome to the Sharing Economy, N.Y. TIMES, (July 20,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/friedman-welcome-to-thesharing-economy.html?pagewanted=all.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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of $80 a night.74 Because of their resourcefulness (and with the help of
a few spare air mattresses), Chesky and Gebbia were able to pay the
rent that month, and ultimately, this experience lead to a much bigger
idea—namely, to create a global network connecting individuals with
space to rent in their homes with travelers seeking short-term rental
accommodations.75 With this goal in mind, Chesky, Gebbia, and Nathan Blecharczyl (who was brought on board to oversee technical
strategy) founded Airbnb in August 2008 in San Francisco,
California.76
2. From Humble Beginnings to Billionaires
Airbnb, which was named in homage to its roots,77 has a broker’s
model, taking a 3% cut from the renter and a 6% to 12% cut from the
traveler, depending on the property price, in exchange for providing
the market and services such as customer support, payment handling,
and eventually insurance for its hosts.78 After an initial slow start,
things began to change when, in order to attract a larger customer
base, Airbnb began focusing its efforts on New York eventually ending the year with 100,000 guest nights booked.79 Encouraged by its
success in New York, Airbnb added additional features to help entice
customers such as escrow payments and professional services to photograph listings.80 The company even expanded the different kinds of
spaces for rent to include “whole houses, driveways and even castles
and tree houses.”81 These and other changes led to rapid growth; by
2010, Airbnb had gone international and total guest nights booked
rose to 750,000.82 By 2011, total guest nights booked exceeded 2
million.83
Since its launch in 2008, Airbnb claims to have connected more
than 40 million travelers with short-term renters (or in Airbnb parlance, “hosts” and “guests”)84 and boasts a presence in more than
34,000 cities and 190 countries, with listings exceeding 1 million worldwide.85 Airbnb has continued to expand its diverse accommodation
74. Id. True to their name, Chesky and Gebbia also served their guests breakfast
and acted as local tour guides. Id.
75. Id.
76. About Us, supra note 4; Our Co-Founders, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/
about/founders (last visited Oct. 12, 2014); Geron, supra note 28.
77. Friedman, supra note 68.
78. Geron, supra note 28.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms (last visited Oct.
12, 2014).
85. About Us, supra note 4.
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offerings to include more than 600 castles,86 as well as more exotic
listings such as a two bedroom suite carved out of an old Boeing 727,
or an igloo complex in Krvavec, Slovenia.87 After its most recent
round of fundraising in April 2014, Airbnb raised approximately $450
billion at a $10 billion valuation, confirming Airbnb co-founders
Chesky, Gebbia, and Belcharczyk as the new Sharing Economy’s first
billionaires.88
3. Role in the Sharing Economy
Airbnb users fall into one of the two previously discussed roles, that
of “peer provider” or “peer user.” Airbnb hosts who advertise space
for rent in their homes play the role of peer providers, whereas
Airbnb guests who book these accommodations through Airbnb are
peer users. Although Airbnb provides the platform for hosts and
guests to connect, the individual hosts and guests ultimately negotiate
and agree upon the rental terms. This arrangement falls within the
collaborative lifestyle system where the peer-to-peer interaction is the
focus of the exchange and not a physical product.89 It is because of
this that a higher degree of trust is often required with collaborative
lifestyles than with product service systems or redistribution markets.
Indeed, as many commentators have noted, Airbnb’s real innovation
is not so much online rentals as it is “trust.”90 In essence, Airbnb has
created a framework of trust in which millions of people feel comfortable renting space in their homes to complete strangers, and it is
largely because of this trust that Airbnb owes its success.91
III. INTERSECTION BETWEEN AIRBNB, THE SHARING ECONOMY,
AND TRADITIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
The Sharing Economy has changed the way consumers access goods
and services by both redefining the production-to-consumer model in
terms of peer-to-peer exchanges, and providing numerous platforms
for doing so.92 Airbnb, in particular, has revolutionized the way consumers travel by facilitating short-term rental accommodations in the
homes of individuals, rather than corporate chain hotels or other similar lodgings.93 The benefits of this arrangement are that consumers
86. Id.
87. Morgan Brennan, The Most Amazing and Absurd Places for Rent, FORBES
(Sept. 16, 2011, 4:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2011/09/16/themost-amazing-and-absurd-places-for-rent/.
88. Alex Conrad, Airbnb Cofounders are Billionaires, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2014, 4:55
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2014/04/18/airbnb-closes-round-at-10billion/.
89. BOTSMAN & ROO, supra note 38, at 73.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 37.
93. About Us, supra note 4.
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typically spend less on rental accommodations; are able to stay longer
and spend more money at their destinations of choice; and can enjoy
the human interaction with their Airbnb hosts.94 Notwithstanding,
Airbnb has not been without its fair share of criticism;95 the majority
of this criticism, however, has focused on the effects ancillary to the
short-term rental transaction with little attention being paid to the legal relationships created between Airbnb hosts and guest and consequent rights and obligations of the parties.96 Thus, in order to better
understand the nature of this relationship, it is helpful to consider it
within the context of two well-established areas of law: landlord and
tenant law and the law of innkeepers.
A. Landlord and Tenant Law
An understanding of the common law origins of landlord and tenant law is essential to understanding its evolution and modern day
application. The following Sections outline the progression of landlord
and tenant law from status to property; discuss changes to this area of
law brought on by modern day conditions and legislation; and finally
consider the defining characteristics of the landlord and tenant
relationship.
1. Historical Context
Landlord and tenant law has its roots in feudal England where, following the Norman Conquest in 1066, title to all lands were held by
William the Conqueror, who divided it among his subjects by “leasing” the land in exchange for services, rather than granting outright
ownership of the land.97 The feudal estate was further subdivided
among subtenants who held the land in “free” or “unfree” tenure.98 A
majority of the English population in the 11th century consisted of
peasants who performed agricultural and other manual services, and
thus, held their lands in “unfree tenure.”99 These individuals were referred to as “tenants in villeinage,” and while they enjoyed legal status
under the law, they had no contractual or property rights.100 Indeed, a
94. See The Economic Impacts of Home Sharing, supra note 33.
95. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 26 (noting concerns incident to the sharing economy in general); see generally Michael Hiltzik, Rental Sites Like Airbnb
Aren’t as Innocuous as They Pretend, L.A. TIMES (July 19, 2015, 5:00), http://
www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-20150719-column.html#page=1; see generally Will Coldwell, Airbnb’s Legal Troubles: What Are The Issues?, GUARDIAN (July
8, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legal-troubles-whatare-the-issues.
96. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 26.
97. Jean C. Love, Landlord’s Liability for Defective Premises, 1975 WIS. L. REV.
19, 23 (1975).
98. Id.
99. Id.; 1–4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 4.05(b) (David
A. Thomas ed., 3rd ed. LexisNexis 2014) [hereinafter THOMPSON].
100. Love, supra note 97, at 24.
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tenant in villeinage was a “tenant at the will of the lord” and could be
ejected by his lord without recourse from the courts.101 Over time, the
status of the villeinage tenant became more secure and was replaced
by the tenancy for a term of years, thus marking the transition of the
landlord and tenant relationship from one of status to contract.102
When the tenancy for years began to be used for agricultural purposes
in the mid-1300s, the landlord and tenant relationship became viewed
as purely contractual on the basis that a wrongfully dispossessed tenant only had an action against the landlord for breach of covenant.103
The era in which the lease was viewed primarily as a contract ended,
however, with the development of the action of ejectment in the late
15th century; by the 16th century, the notion of a lease as a conveyance of property was firmly entrenched in landlord and tenant law.104
As a result, the rights, duties, and obligations of landlords and tenants
became defined according to property law principles.105
The society in which early landlord and tenant law developed was
predominately rural and agrarian and, as such, the land was of principal importance.106 Often there were no structures on the land, and if
there were they were of minimal importance.107 Under the typical agricultural lease, the landlord’s principal obligation was to convey possession of the land to the tenant in return for which the tenant agreed
to pay rent.108 Two important covenants were implied in every lease:
first, the landlord’s covenant to protect the tenant’s “quiet enjoyment” of the premises; and second, the tenant’s covenant to pay
rent.109 These covenants were deemed independent of one another;
thus, the breach by one party did not excuse the performance of the
other.110 In other words, a tenant who failed to pay rent could remain
in possession of the premises with the landlord’s sole remedy being an
action for damages as the rent accrued.111 Likewise, if a landlord
breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the tenant’s obligation to
pay rent was not terminated; rather, the tenant’s remedies were an
101. Id. In contrast, a villeinage tenant could protect his interest against ejection by
a third party in the lord’s courts. Id. Therefore, the villeinage tenant enjoyed a limited
possessory interest by custom, although he was afforded mere status under the law.
Id.
102. Id. Initially, the tenancy for a term developed as a means to obtain loans of
money while avoiding the church’s ban on usury. Robert H. Kelley, Any Reports on
the Death of the Property Law Paradigm for Leases Have Been Greatly Exaggerated,
41 WAYNE L. REV. 1563, 1573 (1995).
103. Love, supra note 97, at 25.
104. Gary Goldman, Uniform Commercial Landlord and Tenant Act, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 175, 180 (2002).
105. See Kelley, supra note 102, at 1565–66.
106. See id. at 1576–77.
107. Id.
108. Love, supra note 97, at 32.
109. Id.
110. Goldman, supra note 104, at 181–82.
111. Love, supra note 97, at 32.
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action for possession and an action for damages for breach of the covenant.112 Another important doctrine that developed at this time was
that of caveat lessee, which meant there was no implied warranty with
regard to the “fitness and habitability of the premises for any particular purpose” and that the tenant agreed to accept the premises “as
is.”113 From this rule followed the principle that the landlord was not
liable in tort to the tenant (or to third parties) for injuries to person or
property resulting from a defect in the premises.114 Thus, a landlord
had no duty to deliver or maintain the premises in any particular condition and the tenant accepted the premises with any existing defects
at the time of the lease.115 The tenant’s only obligation with respect to
the premises was to maintain and make such repairs as necessary to
prevent waste.116
2. Modern Developments
During the Industrial Revolution, the population began to shift
from rural to more urban settings, which increased the importance of
structures on leased land for the purposes of shelter and conducting
business.117 As a result, written lease transactions became more complex as parties frequently included express covenants to address concerns incident to leases in these urban areas.118 Noting the apparent
change to the nature of the lease, commentators began to question
whether the lease should be viewed as a contract or as a conveyance,
with many opining it was both.119 Nonetheless, courts persisted in
characterizing the lease as a conveyance in property, and real property
law continued to govern the landlord and tenant relationship.120
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a revolution in landlord and tenant
law resulting in the rejection of many traditional property-law principles (including the notion of a lease as a conveyance of land) and substitution in their place of new principles more in line with modern
conditions.121 As many scholars have noted, this paradigm shift was
attributed to three main causes: (1) legislative activity;122 (2) the pas112. Id.
113. Goldman, supra note 104, at 181–82.
114. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law,
23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 517 (1982).
115. Love, supra note 97, at 26.
116. Glendon, supra note 114, at 511.
117. Love, supra note 97, at 26.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 27.
120. Id.
121. 2–16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §16.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis
Matthew Bender 2014) [hereinafter POWELL].
122. Goldman, supra note 104, at 183. After World War II, public interest and intervention in the housing area increased, and in 1949 Congress passed the Housing
Act with the goal of achieving “a decent home and suitable living environment for
every living American.” Glendon, supra note 114, at 519. In the ensuing years, many
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sage of the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“URLTA”);123
and (3) modernization through the judiciary by applying contract principles to leases.124 Following this revolution, the departure from traditional principles of landlord and tenant law is most evident in the
following areas: the landlord’s obligation with respect to the premises;
remedies available upon breach; tort liability; summary process proceedings; and termination of the lease.125
Although modern developments have substantially changed landlord and tenant law with respect to the rights and duties of the parties
to a lease, these changes have not altogether supplanted the traditional rules. Thus, it is necessary to take into account both the old and
the new in considering the application and interpretation of landlord
and tenant law.
3. The Landlord and Tenant Relationship
In order for landlord and tenant law to apply in a particular situation, a landlord and tenant relationship must first be found to exist. In
general, this relationship arises by agreement between the parties pursuant to which control of the landlord’s premises is given over to the
tenant in exchange for consideration, usually rent.126 The four defining characteristics of the landlord and tenant relationship are: (1) a
reversion in the landlord; (2) the creation of an estate in the tenant
(either at will or for a term less than that held by the landlord); (3) a
transfer of exclusive possession and control to the tenant; and (4) an
agreement between the parties, either express or implied.127 A tenancy is created when an owner of an estate in land transfers the exclusive possession of the land to another; absent such an agreement no
states and localities passed housing codes detailing health and safety standards; additionally, state legislatures began establishing new obligations for landlords as well as
new rights and remedies for tenants. Id.
123. Goldman, supra note 104, at 183, 185–91. The URLTA was established to clarify and modernize the law governing residential leases and corresponding rights and
obligations of landlords and tenants. Id. at 185–86. The URLTA helped usher in a new
era by shifting the balance between the landlord and tenant, most notably by discarding the archaic notions of independent covenants and caveat emptor. Id. at 186. Since
its approval in 1972, the URLTA has gained widespread acceptance with many states
enacting legislation either modeled after it or influenced by it. Id. at 185.
124. POWELL, supra note 121. Three cases, in particular, are responsible for the
downfall of traditional landlord tenant principles concerning residential tenancies.
Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., allowed a tenant’s tort suit to proceed based
on the landlord’s violation of a code provision; Edwards v. Habib permitted a tenant
to defend an eviction on the grounds the landlord has retaliated against her for reporting code violations; finally, in Jarvis v. First National Realty Co., the court implied
a warranty of habitability in residential leased premises. Glendon, supra note 114, at
521.
125. Glendon, supra note 114, at 528–29.
126. Marden v. Radford, 84 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
127. Id.
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landlord and tenant relationship exists.128 Whether a tenancy is created depends on the intent of the parties.129 Intent may be determined
from the express language of the agreement, or in the absence of clear
intent, may be implied from the parties’ conduct and attendant circumstances.130 The law has traditionally recognized four types of tenancies: (1) the tenancy for a term of years;131 (2) the periodic
tenancy;132 (3) the tenancy at will;133 and (4) the tenancy at sufferance.134 A lease creates a possessory interest in property in favor of
the tenant, the principal feature of which is the tenant’s right to exclusive possession of the premises.135 It is this feature that distinguishes a
tenant’s interest from a mere license, which is a non-possessory right
to use the property of another.136
As previously discussed, at common law the landlord’s principal obligation was to convey possession of the land to the tenant in return
for the tenant’s agreement to pay rent.137 Implied in the lease were
the covenants of quiet enjoyment and the tenant’s covenant to pay
rent, which were deemed independent of one another.138 Thus, the
landlord had no duty to guarantee the habitability of the leased premises, had no duty to maintain or repair, and was furthermore immune
128. See THOMPSON, supra note 99, § 39.06(a)(7).
129. Id. § 39.06(a)(1).
130. Id. § 39.06(a)(7).
131. A lease is for a term of years if it establishes a fixed duration for the lease; that
is, it must have a certain beginning date and must specify in advance the ending date
of the tenancy. THOMPSON, supra note 99, § 39.05(a). The duration of the term for
years may be as short as a specified number of days or as long as the parties specify,
absent a statute limiting the duration. Id.
132. In contrast to a term for years, a periodic tenancy has no definite ending date
and continues from period to period until either party gives proper notice to terminate. Id. § 39.05(b)(2). A periodic tenancy may be created by the express intent of the
parties or may be implied from the parties’ course of dealing in the absence of clear
intent. Id. § 39.05(b)(3). Additionally, a periodic tenancy may arise in three other
ways: 1) as the result of an invalid attempt to create a tenancy for years; 2) by the
landlord choosing to obligate a holdover tenant under a new lease coupled with periodic payments of rent; and 3) when a tenant under a tenancy at will makes regular
periodic payments of rent, which the landlord accepts. Id.
133. A tenancy at will is not measured by any specific period of time and continues
as long as both parties mutually agree to its existence; any action inconsistent with its
continuation terminates the tenancy. Id. § 39.05(d). The parties may agree to create a
tenancy at will, although most often this tenancy is created by operation of law and
typically exists only for a short while, eventually being treated as a periodic tenancy.
Id.
134. Although not a tenancy in a true sense, the tenancy at sufferance exists “because of the unauthorized retention of possession of a tenant whose landlord has not
yet acted in response to the wrongful actions of the holdover tenant.” Id. § 39.05(c). It
should be noted that, practically speaking, only two types of tenancies are commonly
used: the term for years and periodic tenancy. Id. This is true in many states, including
those that have adopted the URLTA. Id. § 39.05.
135. THOMPSON, supra note 99, § 39.04.
136. Id.
137. Love, supra note 97, at 32.
138. Id.
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from liability in tort for injuries to persons or property owing to a
defect in the premises.139 Moreover, a landlord could terminate a tenant’s lease for any reason or for no reason at all, and could recover
possession either by self-help or by an action in ejectment.140
Currently, the majority of jurisdictions impose a duty on the landlord to deliver and maintain the premises in a habitable condition,
termed an “implied warranty of habitability.”141 A tenant’s obligation
not to commit waste has been, in many cases, supplanted by codes,
statutes, and case law, which typically impose on tenants the duty not
to harm the leased premises and “observe certain standards of cleanliness and appropriate use.”142 A landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability entitles the tenant to terminate the lease, in
addition to all the usual contract remedies available for breach of warranty.143 Although courts have been more cautious in imposing tort
liability on landlords, three approaches to determining liability have
emerged.144 First, some courts adhere to the principal of immunity
from liability, subject to a few exceptions.145 Second, courts in a few
states have completely abrogated the doctrine of landlord immunity
instead replacing it with the general standard of tort liability.146 Third,
in rare instances, courts have imposed strict liability on the landlord
for breach of an implied warranty or statutory duty to maintain the
premises.147 Following a tenant’s breach, the landlord now has recourse to summary process proceedings for the recovery of possession; the right to self-help may be reserved in some rare instances,
although most courts have drastically limited this remedy.148 Finally,
the landlord’s right to possession upon termination of the lease has
become qualified on the basis that a landlord may not evict a tenant or
terminate the lease for certain statutorily prescribed reasons.149
139. Glendon, supra note 114, at 514–17.
140. POWELL, supra note 121, § 17.01.
141. Kelley, supra note 102, at 1595.
142. Glendon, supra note 114, at 529; UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT
ACT (URLTA) § 3.101 (UNIF. LAW COMMISSION) (listing duties of a tenant).
143. Glendon, supra note 114, at 532. In many jurisdictions a tenant is authorized to
remain in possession of the premises and withhold rent, although “this remedy is
often carefully circumscribed with preconditions and safeguards.” Id. at 533.
144. Id. at 535; POWELL, supra note 121, § 16B.08.
145. Glendon, supra note 114, at 536–36.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. POWELL, supra note 121, § 17.01.
149. Glendon, supra note 114, at 540. For example, a landlord cannot terminate or
refuse to rent on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. Further
restrictions have been placed on evictions in states and municipalities where the number of rental units has been dramatically decreased by their conversion into condominiums. Id. at 542. Additionally, a landlord must have “good cause” to evict in most
rent-controlled jurisdictions and in public housing programs. Id.
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B. The Law of Innkeepers
An understanding of the common law origins of the law of innkeepers is likewise essential to understanding its evolution and modern day
application. The following Sections outline the common law development of the law of innkeepers and discuss modern statutory developments before finally considering the defining characteristics of the
innkeeper and guest relationship.
1. Historical Context
As with landlord and tenant law, the law of innkeepers developed
in England during the Middle Ages.150 At this time, there was a good
amount of traveling on foot and by horseback despite the terrible road
conditions and ever-present danger of attack by outlaws and robbers.151 As a result, travelers were obliged to carry very light weight
baggage and to secure protection from thieves and outlaws at night.152
Because travelers could not conveniently carry food with them on the
road or risk sleeping out in the open, roadside inns were established
throughout Medieval England in order to provide food and drink,
nighttime accommodations, and even entertainment to weary travelers.153 The fundamental characteristic of inns at this time was their
public nature; that is, the inn was viewed as a house “kept publicly,
open, and notoriously, for the entertainment and accommodations of
travelers and others, for a reward.”154 It follows that the innkeeper
was engaged in public employment and, as such, his primary duty was
to serve every traveler who sought respite at his inn.155 This duty required innkeepers to provide adequate service at a reasonable price,
and further, to serve members of the public equally and without
discrimination.156
The innkeeper was one who, on his own account, not only professed
to serve the public by keeping an inn, but also made it his regular
business to do so.157 Because the innkeeper undertook to serve the
needs of transient guests (that is, individuals staying at the inn for a
brief period during the course of their travels), one who did not serve
150. JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAW OF INNKEEPERS 4 (3d ed. 1993).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 5.
153. Id. There are several important differences between the inn and the alehouse
or tavern at this time. The former was instituted for travelers; provided food; and was
open at night for the protection of travelers. Id. at 6. The latter, on the other hand,
served the local population; furnished drink “for the mere pleasure of neighbors”; and
turned its guest out upon closing time. Id.
154. Id. at 9.
155. Id. at 9–10.
156. JOHN HENRY BEALE, JR., THE LAW OF INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS 36 (1906).
157. SHERRY, supra note 150 at 10. At common law, the right to keep an inn was
unrestricted. BEALE, supra note 156, at 29.
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transient guests was not an innkeeper.158 The innkeeper was thus distinguished from private householders, who would occasionally, and
even frequently, receive travelers in their homes for compensation, on
the ground that these private householders did not make it their business to receive such travelers.159 The innkeeper did not need to declare his readiness to serve the public by any special means; instead, it
was sufficient if the innkeeper made his intention to do so public “by
word or by act.”160 Stated differently, the innkeeper was one who, by
any method, solicited the patronage of the public.161
The respective rights, duties, and responsibilities of an innkeeper
and his guest have their origin in public policy, as one of the main
purposes of the inn was to secure the protection of travelers and their
property.162 In general, the innkeeper’s duties to his guest were divided into three classes: the provision of shelter, protection, and
food.163 Thus, the innkeeper was obligated to provide reasonably safe
premises; furnish accommodations;164 exercise reasonable care in the
protection of the guest;165 protect the guest from injury by third parties;166 and supply as much food as the guest reasonably required.167
In addition, an innkeeper was responsible for the goods of his guest.168
This responsibility could not be limited by contract and it extended to
goods that were bailed to the innkeeper (i.e., put into his possession
for a particular purpose, generally for safekeeping), goods that remained in the guest’s possession,169 and goods of the guest that were
either lost or stolen from the inn.170
The innkeeper could eject a guest for proper cause, for example,
due to intoxication or for otherwise “making a disturbance.”171 Additional grounds for ejection included a guest’s contraction of a contagious disease or a guest’s refusal to pay after falling into arrears and
158. SHERRY, supra note 150, at 11.
159. Id. at 10; Lyon v. Smith, 1 Morris, 184, 186 (Iowa 1843).
160. BEALE, supra note 156, at 19; SHERRY, supra note 150, at 15.
161. SHERRY, supra note 150, at 15.
162. Id. at 15–16.
163. BEALE, supra note 156, at 109.
164. Id. at 110–15.
165. Id. at 118.
166. Id. To be sure, the innkeeper was not the insurer of his guest’s safety; nonetheless, the innkeeper had the duty to protect his guests, to the best of his ability, through
reasonable means. Id. at 123.
167. Id. at 117.
168. BEALE, supra note 156, at 97, 145. This responsibility was not limited to goods
of a particular kind; rather, it extended to money and all other personal property the
guest brought into the inn. Id. at 136.
169. Id. at 98, 102.
170. Id. at 126, 131. This was true even though the loss or theft of the goods was
without actual negligence on the part of the innkeeper. Id. at 135. The innkeeper was
not liable, however, if goods were lost due to an act of God or of a public enemy or
through the fault of the owner. Id. at 131–32.
171. BEALE, supra note 156, at 71.
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upon demand for payment by the innkeeper.172 Further, an innkeeper
was justified in excluding a guest if that guest ceased to be a guest and
had become a resident instead.173
Finally, because the law imposed upon the innkeeper a duty to receive all those who presented themselves as guests at his inn, the law
gave the innkeeper not only the right to compensation from the guest,
but also a lien on the guest’s goods to the extent of his unpaid
charges.174 Unlike other common law liens, the innkeeper did not
need to have actual possession of the goods in order to enforce the
lien.175 Thus, the innkeeper could prevent the goods from being removed from the inn, take the goods into his own possession, and hold
the goods as security for payment.176
2. Modern Developments
In contrast to landlord and tenant law, which has undergone significant reform, the law of innkeepers has persisted without significant
change from the common law, except with respect to innkeeper’s liens
and an innkeeper’s liability for his guest’s property. This Section highlights some ways in which the common law of innkeepers has changed
over time before discussing the more significant statutory
developments.
First, the term “innkeeper” has become obsolete except in legal terminology177 as “hotel keeper,”178 “tavern keeper,”179 and similar
terms have been considered synonymous with “innkeeper.” Likewise,
the common law definition of an innkeeper—one who holds himself
open to the public to receive guests for compensation—180 has been
broadened by statute to include the proprietor “of any hotel, inn . . .
or motel where beds or lodging are for hire.”181 It follows from this
that modern-day hotels, motels, and like establishments have succeeded to the role of the medieval roadside inn.182 Thus, an establishment that provides accommodations to travelers for a fee may be
172. Id. at 71–73.
173. Id. at 73. In this last respect, the innkeeper had to justify such exclusion by
making an affirmative showing the guest was no longer a traveler, but had become a
resident. Id. In making this determination the length of residence was a relevant factor, although not dispositive. Id.
174. Id. at 175–76. The lien attached upon receipt of the guest at the inn, even
though the time for payment had not yet arrived. Id. at 188.
175. Id. at 176.
176. Id.
177. Langford v. Vandaveer, 254 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky. 1953).
178. McClaugherty v. Cline, 163 S.W. 801, 801 (Tenn. 1913).
179. Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296, 306 (1849).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 160–61.
181. Williams v. Riley, 289 S.E.2d 102, 104 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); see also UTAH
CODE ANN. § 29-2-102 (West 2015); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 505 (West
2015); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.70 (West 2015); see also KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-501, 36-601 (West 2015).
182. THOMPSON, supra note 99, § 52.02.
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properly characterized as an inn regardless of its physical structure or
name.183
At common law, it was essential that a person seek both food and
accommodations in order to be a guest;184 modernly, it is sufficient
that a person only seek accommodations.185 The innkeeper’s broad
liability for the loss of or damage to the property of his guests has, in
every jurisdiction, been limited by statute to some extent.186 The most
common of these provisions set monetary limits on the loss of items
that are retained by the guest, deposited with the establishment for
safekeeping, or in some instances both.187 Notice of a secure place for
the safekeeping of valuables is an important component in many rules
limiting an innkeeper’s liability, and in some jurisdictions, a guest who
receives proper notice and thereafter ignores it is barred from recovery.188 Finally, almost all jurisdictions provide for a statutory lien
under which an innkeeper may retain possession of luggage or other
personal property of his or her guest as security for payment.189
3. The Innkeeper and Guest Relationship
In order to establish the innkeeper and guest relationship, a guest
must first communicate his intention to be received as such and the
innkeeper must have the opportunity to either receive or reject the
guest.190 If the guest thus “presents himself” and is accepted, the relationship “is instantly established between them” and the rights and
duties of both parties are at once fixed by law rather than by contract.191 This result follows from the fact that, once a guest is admitted
to an inn, the innkeeper’s obligation to care for him is imposed by law
and not by the will of the parties.192 The relationship is terminated
upon the guest paying his bill and leaving the inn without any intention of returning.193 Finally, the guest receives a mere license granting
him the use and occupancy of the premises.194
183. Langford v. Vandaveer, 254 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky. 1953).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 163–64, 167.
185. See ALA. CODE § 34-15-1 (2015) (defining a hotel as any establishment where
sleeping accommodations are held out to be available to transients).
186. THOMPSON, supra note 99, § 52.05(a).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 52.05(b).
189. Id. § 52.10(a).
190. BEALE, supra note 156, at 79.
191. Id. at 75, 78–79.
192. Id. at 75, 78–79. Although a contract is not necessary, there must still exist a
mutual intent to receive and be received in order for the relationship to exist. Id.
193. Id. at 162.
194. Kearny v. Mun. Sanitary Landfill Auth., 363 A.2d 390, 394 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1976).
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Classifying the Airbnb “host” and “guest” relationship in terms of
landlord and tenant law or the law of innkeepers is determinative of
the legal obligations and rights of both parties. However, it is not so
easy to classify these relationships in terms of these discrete areas of
law, which is largely due to the way these relationships are created
and the disparate expectations of the parties who create them. As we
saw in the introduction, an excellent example of this disparity is the
case of Cory Tschogl and her Airbnb guest-turned-squatter.195
The following Section distinguishes between the principle features
of landlord and tenant law and the law of innkeepers before considering Tschogl’s experience in the context of each area of law. This is
done in order to highlight the difficulties in classifying these relationships and resulting disparity in the rights and obligations of both parties. Next, this Section argues that the Airbnb host and guest
relationship is best understood, and should be regulated, in the context of the law of innkeepers. Finally, this Section briefly considers
policy arguments in support of regulation.
A. Landlord and Tenant Law and the Law
of Innkeepers Distinguished
Under landlord and tenant law, the relationship between the parties
arises by agreement, express or implied, pursuant to which a tenancy
or lease is created in favor of the tenant.196 A lease is a possessory
interest in property, the principal feature of which is the tenant’s exclusive possession of the premises.197 The primary obligation of the
tenant is to pay rent.198 The landlord, on the other hand, impliedly
covenants that the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the premises will not
be disturbed and that the premises are fit for habitation.199 The landlord must maintain the premises in a habitable condition and may be
held liable for injury to persons or property owing to a defect in the
premises.200 In general, a landlord may not resort to self-help repossession of the premises and must instead pursue summary process proceedings.201 Finally, a landlord may not evict a tenant for certain
prescribed reasons.202
Under the law of innkeepers, the relationship between the parties is
implied by law or in some cases arises under contract when the inn195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra Part I.
discussion supra
discussion supra
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Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
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keeper receives a guest seeking accommodations.203 In contrast to a
tenant, who receives a possessory interest property, the guest receives
only a license, which is merely permission to use land for a specified
purpose with no interest in or exclusive possession of the land.204 Similar to the landlord’s implied covenant of habitability, the innkeeper
must provide premises that are reasonably safe. Unlike the landlord,
however, the innkeeper must not only provide reasonably safe accommodations but has an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care in
the protection of the guest and to protect the guest against third parties. An innkeeper may resort to self-help to eject a guest who is “unruly and disorderly,”205 among other reasons, whereas a landlord must
follow the relevant statutory procedures for eviction, and even then
the landlord is limited in the grounds he can assert to evict a tenant.
Generally speaking, a landlord is not responsible for safeguarding his
tenant’s property. This difference is because the exclusive possession
of the premises is given over to the tenant, who, being in the better
position to protect his property, has the responsibility of doing so. In
contrast, an innkeeper may be held liable for the loss of, theft, or damage to the guest’s property. Finally, the innkeeper receives a lien over
the guest’s property as security for payment, whereas the landlord
generally does not.
B. Classifying Airbnb “Hosts” and “Guests”
As we saw earlier, Cory Tschogl had difficulty “making ends meet”
with high rent rates in San Francisco, so she invested in a vacation
rental condo in Palm Springs which, she then rented out to travelers
through Airbnb.206 This arrangement worked well for about a year—
after all, Tschogl was able to earn the extra income she needed
through the minimal effort of listing her condo and booking reservations using Airbnb’s online platform.207 This changed, however, when
Tschogl rented her condo to the proverbial “guest from hell” who,
despite being twice asked to leave, complained about the accommodations, overstayed his reservation, failed to pay the full reservation cost,
and threatened legal action against Tschogl.208 Ultimately, Tschogl resorted to eviction proceedings to oust the Airbnb guest-turned-squat-

203. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
204. Poroznoff v. Alberti, 391 A.2d 984, 987 (Passaic County Ct. 1978), aff’d, 401
A.2d 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (noting a guest is a mere licensee with
only a right of use of the room he occupies).
205. Id. at 988.
206. See supra Part I.
207. See supra Part I.
208. See supra Part I.
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ter, and “after an arduous two months,”209 finally reclaimed her
condo.
It is unclear whether Tschogl, a rehabilitation therapist, understood
that renting her condo to travelers created a legal relationship between the parties, pursuant to which certain rights and obligations are
accorded. After all, no laws were in place regulating Airbnb at the
time and the company did little (if anything) to educate its users about
the potential legal consequences of using its platform to facilitate
these transactions. Even assuming Tschogl realized that the agreement between her and her guest created a legal relationship, it is evident from Tschogl’s interactions with her guest that she did not fully
appreciate the parties’ respective rights and obligations arising under
the agreement. This is not surprising, however, because of the inherent difficulty in classifying the relationship between the parties as either landlord and tenant or innkeeper and guest. As the following
Section illustrates, the relationship between Tschogl and her guest
could reasonably be classified as either.
Under landlord and tenant law, for example, the four requirements
to create a landlord and tenant relationship were likely met in
Tschogl’s case.210 First, Tschogl was the owner of the condo and thus
was entitled to its possession once her guest’s reservation ended. Second, Tschogl agreed to rent her condo to her guest for a little over a
month, which rental period having a definite beginning and ending
could reasonably be viewed as a tenancy for a term of years.211 Third,
Tschogl transferred the exclusive possession of her condo to her guest
for the duration of his reservation in exchange for a fee. Lastly, this
arrangement was made possible as the result of the parties’ express
agreement.
If a landlord and tenant relationship was created between Tschogl
and her guest, certain rights and obligations were at once fixed between the parties whether they realized it or not. Thus, the guest’s
complaints about the quality of the tap water (assuming they were
credible) raise concerns about Tschogl’s potential liability for breach
of implied warranty, as does Tschogl’s warning she would shut off the
utilities if the guest did not leave. Furthermore, Tschogl would have
been required to pursue eviction proceedings against her guest even in
the absence of the California law which, in this case, treated her guest
as a tenant on a month-to-month lease.
Under the law of innkeepers, the innkeeper and guest relationship
was likely established, too, once the guest booked his reservation
(thereby notifying Tschogl of his intent to be received as a guest at her
209. Skip Descant, Airbnb Squatter Checks Out of Palm Springs Apartment, USA
TODAY (Aug. 20, 2014, 7:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/
tourism/2014/08/20/airbnb-palm-springs-squatter/14362779/.
210. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
211. See supra note 131.
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condo in exchange for compensation), and Tschogl’s subsequent acceptance, in which case the rights and duties of the parties were instantly fixed by law. In contrast to landlord and tenant law, the guest
here would have received a mere license to use Tschogl’s condo,
which license is generally revocable at will. Thus, it would have been
well within Tschogl’s rights to terminate her guest’s reservation solely
because she had a “bad gut feeling” about him.212 After allowing him
to stay, however, Tschogl would have had the heightened duty of an
innkeeper to provide safe accommodations as well as provide for the
safety of her guest and his belongings. After Tschogl’s guest failed to
pay for the full reservation, Tschogl would likely have had a statutory
lien on her guest’s property to the extent of the charges due, and
moreover, Tschogl could have summarily ejected her guest without
resorting to eviction proceedings. Additionally, Tschogl could have
ejected her guest on the grounds he intended to remain in the condo
as a resident rather than as a guest.
Tschogl’s experience is illustrative of the difficulty in classifying the
types of relationships that are created when, using Airbnb’s online
platform, individuals rent space in their homes to travelers seeking
short-term accommodations. This is merely one example, however. As
previously noted, Airbnb currently lists accommodations of varying
degrees in more than 190 countries and has hosted more than 11 million guests to date.213 Every transaction that Airbnb facilitates is
unique with respect to the location, accommodations offered, and
length of stay, among other features. However, the relationships created between the parties are not; rather, they may reasonably be classified as either a landlord and tenant relationship or innkeeper and
guest relationship. Because of the difficulty in classifying these relationships correctly, and consequent uncertainty in the corresponding
rights and duties of the parties, states and municipalities should enact
legislation clearly defining these relationships at their outset.214
C. Approach to Regulation
The relationship between Airbnb hosts and guests is best understood in terms of the law of innkeepers and should be regulated accordingly. This is because the relationship between an Airbnb host
and his guest more closely resembles that of an innkeeper and his
guest insofar as the host agrees to provide short-term accommodations to travelers for a fee.215 Apart from this outward appearance in
212. Bort, supra note 1.
213. See supra Part II.B.2.
214. Some jurisdictions have, in fact, enacted laws regulating Airbnb and similar
companies; these approaches to regulation vary in degree by municipality. See Gottlieb, supra note 36.
215. The fact that, at common law, an innkeeper was one who professed to serve
the public should not prevent modern-day Airbnb hosts from being considered as
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similarity, the expectations of the parties are likely best represented
by the innkeeper and guest relationship. To be sure, the Airbnb host
has succeeded to the role of the hotel proprietor and hotel rooms have
been replaced with the private homes of individuals.216 Despite this
change in setting, however, the parties’ expectations remain largely
unchanged—the Airbnb host is interested in earning a profit in exchange for permitting the limited use of his premises, whereas the
Airbnb guest is concerned with securing safe, pleasant accommodations for the duration of his stay. Because of this similarity in expectations, it is likely that Airbnb hosts and guests intend to enter into an
innkeeper and guest relationship, rather than that of a landlord and
tenant, when accommodations are made for short-term accommodations. Thus, states and municipalities should expand the modern day
application of the law of innkeepers to include Airbnb hosts and
guests in certain narrowly tailored circumstances. This approach recognizes the expectations of the parties and provides a framework for
understanding their respective rights and obligations.
D. Policy Arguments for Regulating Airbnb
As noted above, the difficulty in classifying Airbnb hosts and guests
raises concerns regarding the parties’ respective rights and obligations
under the law. The following Section outlines public policy arguments
in support of regulating these relationships when, as is inevitable, disputes arise between the parties. Specifically, regulation is appropriate
in order to protect individuals and promote efficiency in adjudicating
claims that may arise.
1. Protecting Airbnb Hosts and Guests
As an initial matter, it is appropriate for states and municipalities to
enact laws regulating the legal relationship between Airbnb hosts and
guests for two reasons. First, it is well within a state’s police power to
regulate hotels and similar establishments for the public health and
safety of its guests, which concerns are particularly relevant to the
Airbnb host and guest relationship.217 After all, at the heart of this
relationship is essentially an agreement between strangers whereby
one invites the other to stay in his home for a fee. In contrast to hotels
such. Indeed, although the typical Airbnb host may not hang a welcome sign over his
door, by listing his home as available for rent through Airbnb’s online platform, it
cannot be reasonably said that, in doing so, he does not “profess to serve the public.”
See supra text accompanying notes 160–61.
216. That these arrangements are similar to hotels is further evidenced by the fact
that several jurisdictions impose a transient occupancy tax on Airbnb guests, which
tax has before only applied in the context of hotels. See Ann Carrns, Lodging Taxes
and Airbnb Hosts: Who Pays and How, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/your-money/lodging-taxes-and-airbnb-hosts-who-pays-and-how
.html?_r=0.
217. Texarkana v. Brachfield, 207 Ark. 774, 780, 183 S.W.2d 304, 307 (1944).
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(which are in the business of providing travel accommodations and
are subject to considerable regulation), guests who book reservations
in the homes of private individuals through Airbnb do so at their own
risk. Further, an Airbnb host’s principal interest, similar to a hotel, is
to earn a profit. However, unlike a hotel, a host is less likely to realize
the extent of his legal obligations, if he realizes them at all. Although
Airbnb users may self-regulate these transactions to some degree (for
example, by posting user reviews and using social media sites to verify
one’s identify) these transactions largely operate without the oversight
of Airbnb and, in most cases, local governments. Thus, these arrangements are, at least potentially, open invitations for a number of safetyrelated concerns.
Second, states and municipalities should enact laws regulating these
relationships from a consumer protection standpoint. Consumer transactions are typically defined as those for “personal” or “family” purposes.218 It is likely that, in a majority of cases, a guest who books
travel accommodations through Airbnb does so either for personal or
family reasons; therefore, it is appropriate to characterize these as
consumer transactions.219 Both state and federal governments have
enacted laws for the protection of consumers on the basis that, in general, consumers lack the bargaining power and expertise of the other
party to the transaction.220 Because Airbnb is largely unregulated, it is
perhaps impossible to gauge the varying degrees of bargaining power
and expertise that exists between Airbnb hosts and guests. However,
the potential exists for there to be a great disparity in terms of the
respective bargaining power and expertise of Airbnb hosts and guests.
This disparity is evidenced by the fact that, in some areas, Airbnb
hosts manage multiple listings, which they rent year-round to
guests.221 Likewise, a guest experienced with booking accommodations through Airbnb may be in a position to take advantage of an
inexperienced host. This eventuality is apparent in Tschogl’s case,
where her Airbnb guest seemed to know exactly what he could “get
away with.” This is not to suggest that laws enacted to protect consumers should benefit those who, like Tschogl’s guest, take advantage of
the system. Rather, the goal of such legislation should be to provide a
218. James H. Backman, The Tenant as Consumer? A Comparison of Development
in Consumer Law and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980).
219. In fact, as of July 2014 only about 10% of Airbnb’s customers were business
travelers. Mike Isaac, Airbnb Expands Into Business Travel, Bits, N.Y. TIMES, (July
28, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/airbnb-expands-into-business-travel/?_r=0. This will likely change, however, in light of the company’s business
travel initiative. Id.
220. See generally Backman, supra note 218 (discussing the applicability of consumer laws in the area of landlord and tenant law). Typically these transactions concern residential landlords, producers, suppliers, or servicemen. Id. at 3.
221. See, e.g., ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 10 (2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report
.pdf.
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level playing field for hosts and guests alike, while also guarding
against potential abuse by either party.
2. Judicial and Administrative Efficiency
In the early 20th century population expansion and improved construction methods dramatically changed the character and increased
the importance of rental housing, and in the ensuing years, courts
struggled to determine the legal obligations and rights of owners and
occupants of rented premises.222 Courts ultimately classified a particular occupant as a tenant, lodger, or guest in order to make this determination and, in doing so, focused primarily on the living conditions
of the occupant of the rented premises.223 This sort of ad hoc classification was not only inefficient, but it left too much room for judicial
discretion. From this followed several results: decisions often turned
on the presence or absence of a particular factor;224 the exclusiveness
of the occupancy became the principal focus to the exclusion of other
factors;225 and favoritism toward contractual clauses led to a disregard
of the parties’ express intent.226
It is likely that, in the advent of Airbnb and the Sharing Economy,
courts will again be required to determine the rights and duties of
both renters and occupants. In order to promote administrative efficiency, and avoid ad hoc classification of these relationships based on
the factors in a particular case, states and municipalities should enact
laws that define these relationships at their outset. Such an approach
to regulation leaves little room for judicial discretion, which, in turn,
leads to the consistent application and better understanding of applicable laws. Moreover, legislators are better suited to enact laws addressing these relationships than courts because they can do so
quickly and comprehensively.
V. CONCLUSION
Airbnb and the Sharing Economy are revolutionizing the way host
and guest relationships are created by providing an online platform
through which individuals can easily and efficiently connect to share
space in their homes on a short-term basis for profit. As previously
noted, there are many benefits to these types of arrangements for
Airbnb hosts and guests alike. However, difficulty exists in determining the respective rights and obligations of hosts and guests because
this relationship has been taken out of the traditional hotel setting,
where the law of innkeepers reigns, and instead, has been placed in
222.
Rental
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Comment, Tenant, Lodger, and Guest: Questionable categories for Modern
Occupants, 64 YALE L.J. 391, 391 (1955).
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
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the homes of private individuals where landlord and tenant law predominately prevails. Because of this difficulty, states and municipalities should enact laws defining the Airbnb host and guest relationship
in terms of the law of innkeepers because the parties’ expectations are
more closely in line with those of an innkeeper and his guest. Such an
approach to regulation will have two results. First, this will reduce or
altogether eliminate the potential for disparity between the bargaining
power and expertise of hosts, which protects both parties and guards
against potential abuses. Second, hosts and guests will have a clear
understanding of their respective rights and obligations at the outset
of the relationship, which promotes efficiency in adjudicating any disputes that may arise and avoids the problem of courts making ad hoc
classifications based on varying circumstances in a particular case.
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